Judicial decisions, especially those of the highest courts, enjoy a high degree of authority at the national level. At the supranational level, too, states have established judicial bodies, bestowed on them the authority to decide on legal disputes and assigned institutional procedures specifically set up for this purpose. One of the most prominent examples of this is the dispute settlement procedure provided for under the World Trade System. It was developed within the framework of the establishment of the WTO in 1995, broadening the initially applicable one-stage "panel procedure" of the GATT 1947 into a two-stage procedure with an appellate review[1]. For a long time, this expansion was seen as an undisputed success in multilateral integration and the decisions were widely accepted. Today, it is precisely this acceptance, which for decades was considered a consensus among the WTO contracting parties, that is being brought into question. Already under President Obama's administration, the US withheld its required vote for the gradual replacement of Appellate Body Members and has consistently continued to do so into the Biden presidency as well.
[1] See for example: World Trade Organization, Historic development of the WTO dispute settlement system, The system under GATT 1947 and its evolution over the years, Geneva 2020 and further: Craig Van Grasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade Organization, pp. 229–270 (on the composition of the Panel and the Appelate Body p. 258 f.), Geneva 2013.[...]